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INTRODUCTION
In February of 1983, the Supreme Court of Delaware decided
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc..' The case holds that, in determining the present
value of a corporation involved in an acquisition, courts are free to use
"any techniques or methods [of valuation] which are generally considered
acceptable in the financial community ...."2
The rule in Delaware prior to Weinberger required courts to determine
the present value of a corporation by use of the Delaware block method of
valuation 3 exclusively. 4 The Delaware block method, however, is a poor
way to determine the present value of a corporation. 5 As a result, even
1. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
2. Id. at 713.
3. See, e.g. Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARv.
L. REv. 1453, 1468-71 (1966) (discussing Delaware's use of the weighted average or
Delaware block approach). Under the Delaware Block valuation methodology, up to four
factors are considered. Id. The factors are earnings value, asset value, market value and
dividend value. Id. Each value is determined and then weighted to arrive at the final value
for the company. Id.; see also, e.g., Steven Rogers, Note, The Dissenting Shareholder's
Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 629, 632-43 (1977) (discussing the use by courts of
the weighted average approach).
4. See, e.g.. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950); see also
Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 554-55 (Del. 2000) ("Tri-Continental was
decided at a time when the Delaware Block Method was the exclusive basis for calculating
the value of a corporation in an appraisal proceeding.").
5. See infra discussion accompanying notes 137-38.
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before the Weinberger decision, commentators6 had sharply criticized the
methodology, and Delaware courts occasionally had strayed from a rigid
application of this mandated valuation method.7 The Weinberger opinion,
therefore, offered a welcome opportunity to move away from this tired and
unsound valuation methodology. Courts, it seemed, were encouraged to
develop a new common law of valuation, one that was informed by
sensible, modem finance theory.
8
This article examines the extent to which courts in corporate
acquisition cases have, since the date of Weinberger, incorporated modem
finance theory into their decisions. The data that are the focus of the article
are derived from seventy-six decisions rendered after Weinberger.9 The
6. See, e.g., Elmer J. Schaefer, The Fallacy of Weighting Asset Value and Earnings
Value in the Appraisal of Corporate Stock, 55 S.CAL. L. REv. 1031, 1032 (1982) ("[T]he
weighting method consistently underestimates the value of corporate shares .... ). Id. at
1032. Later commentators continued to criticize the Delaware block method. See, e.g.,
Joseph Evan Calio, New Appraisals of Old Problems: Reflections on the Delaware
Appraisal Proceeding, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 38-41 (1994) (restating many of the earlier
criticisms of the Delaware block method).
7. For example, under the Delaware block method, the earnings value component was
to be calculated by using the company's historical earnings. Calio, supra note 6, at 38. In
David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int"l, Inc., however, after recognizing that the "settled law
in Delaware [is] that earnings value is to be determined on the basis of past and not on
prospective earnings," the Delaware Chancery Court went on to add that it was not "obliged
to blindly use past earnings without reference to other factors of record." 249 A.2d 427, 433
(Del. Ch. 1968). In another example, Universal City Studios, Inc.v. Francis I. duPont &
Co., the Supreme Court of Delaware authorized the use of a higher than normal multiplier,
due in part to the fact that projected earnings exceeded the historical earnings of the
company. 334 A.2d 216, 220 (Del. 1975) (The court found "[t]he steady upward trend in
Universal's earnings and the vast amount of money guaranteed to inure to Universal are
persuasive factors indicating future economic success and stability.").
8. A number of articles in recent years have addressed various problems encountered
by courts when they are called upon in corporate acquisitions to quantify the obligation of
fairness owed to shareholders affected by the transaction. See generally, e.g., Rutheford B
Campbell, Jr., Fair Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 N.C. L. REv. 101
(1999) (articulating definitions of fair value and fair price); Barry M. Wertheimer, The
Shareholders'Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613
(1998) (A sweeping exposition of the manner in which courts handle some of the most
difficult and prevalent issues that arise in appraisal proceedings). A number of these articles
have dealt with the historical and appropriate present day purposes of statutory appraisal
proceedings. See generally Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3
DEL. L. REv. 1 (2000); Peter V. Letsou, The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L.
REv. 1121 (1998); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's
Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1 (1995); Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal
Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 79 (1995).
9. Throughout this article, the text and the footnotes refer to a data base of seventy-six
cases. All of the cases in this data base are listed in the table in the Appendix to this article.
The table in the Appendix also provides information supporting Table I through Table 18 in
the text.
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cases involve corporate acquisitions where shareholders either exercised
their appraisal rights or challenged the acquisition under fiduciary duty
rules, and courts, as a result, were required to determine the value of the
corporation or the shareholders' proportionate interest in the corporation.
The conclusions from the data are not very encouraging. In short,
courts since Weinberger have, to a significant extent, failed to base their
opinions on modem finance theory. For example, the data indicate that
courts in only about one-third of their opinions relied on the discounted
cash flow valuation methodology, the valuation method broadly accepted
in modem finance theory.10 The data show that other inappropriate and
unsound methodologies, such as the weighted average method11 and asset
valuations,12 continue to be used in a large percentage of all decisions.
The opinions from which the data are derived also reveal the struggle
that courts have in rendering these valuation decisions. Too often in the
cases, one finds courts facing overwhelmingly complex, tedious, and
extreme evidence of value offered by the parties' experts, evidence that in
its worst form becomes essentially unmanageable and incredible for even
the most skillful judges. This problem of the "dueling experts" further
complicates the job of the courts and makes it more difficult to reach a
sensible decision in the particular case and, more broadly, to develop a
sensible common law of valuation.
Notwithstanding these past failures and difficulties, courts are entirely
capable of developing a workable and theoretically sound common law of
present value. This cannot be accomplished, however, within the existing
framework of extreme flexibility articulated in Weinberger.13 Indeed, if
Weinberger teaches us anything after twenty years, it is that a sensible body
of common law respecting the determination of present value cannot
develop without courts' articulation of concrete rules informed by modem
finance theory.
Part I of the article offers a brief overview of modem present value
theory, which in turn furnishes a framework for the exposition of the data
and the subsequent critical evaluations and prescriptions that are offered.
Part II of the article describes five categories of valuation methodologies
10. See infra notes 15-18, 87 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 78-83, 137-38 and accompanying text (describing and criticizing
this methodology).
12. See infra notes 69-71, 134-36 and accompanying text (describing and criticizing
this methodology).
13. One finds occasional cases in which courts utilize a single mandatory valuation
regime. See, e.g., Steiner Corp. v. Benninghoff, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (D. Nev. 1998)
(holding that valuation would be determined only under the weighted average method).
[Vol. 53:1
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used in this piece to classify the data. With these foundations laid, Part III
presents the data regarding courts' valuation methodologies utilized in
cases decided after Weinberger. And, finally, Part IV offers interpretations
and explanations of the data and suggests how courts might facilitate a
transition to judicial resolutions that are more in line with modem finance
theory.
I. A BRIEF LOOK AT PRESENT VALUE THEORY
This section describes the fundamentals of modem present value
theory and offers a series of relatively simple rules or concepts about which
there is broad agreement among financial economists.
The purpose here is not to present any exhaustive restatement of
modem present value theory.' 4 Rather, this section is intended to provide a
framework for the exposition and discussion of the data and to support
interpretative and critical points offered later in this article.
A. Valuation Based on Discounted Cash Flows
To the financial economist, present value of an asset, including a
company or a partial ownership interest in the company, is determined by
projected cash flows discounted by an appropriate factor.' 5 This approach
is broadly agreed upon by financial economists 16 and thus, for example, is
the basis for a major portion of modem corporate finance books, such as
Professors Brealey and Myers's standard text, Principles of Corporate
Finance.17 For an evaluator, including a court, to arrive at a sound estimate
14. Dean Samuel C. Thompson has done this, however, in his fine article, A Lawyer's
Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L. 457
(1996).
15. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 113-15 (5th ed. 1996) [hereinafter BREALEY & MYERS].
16. There are, of course, numerous outstanding books that explicate modem finance
theory and modem theory regarding present value. See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 15; EUGENE F. GRIGHAM ET AL., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE (9th
ed. 1998); STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE (6th ed. 2002).
For reference and authority in this paper, the author has chosen to rely principally on
BREALEY & MYERS and thus will offer only occasional reference to any of the other texts
listed above.
17. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at 11. In their book, the authors begin their
introduction of present value by applying present value to more usual assets, such as
apartment buildings or office buildings. See, e.g., id. at 11-12. They later utilize the
discounted cash flow method to value corporate securities and later to businesses as a
whole. Id. at 59-73. The authors say, at one point, "Value today always equals future cash
flow discounted at the opportunity cost of capital." Id. at 73.
2003]
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of present value, therefore, the evaluator must make a sound estimate of
cash flows and determine a sound discount rate.
1 8
The subsections of this paper that follow provide brief discussions of
some concepts upon which the discounted cash flow methodology of
valuation is based. These particular concepts were selected because they
involve matters that recur in court opinions and, unfortunately, are matters
about which courts sometimes make theoretical mistakes.
B. Cash Flows
1. Future - NOt Historic Cash Flows
Present value of an asset, including a company or share of stock, is
determined by the person's (or the market's) expectations regarding the
future value that the asset will generate.19 A corollary of this is that
historical performance is per se irrelevant to present value.
Consider, for example, an apartment building. Assume that last year
an apartment generated total cash flows (e.g., revenues less expenses) of
$100,000. Due to a dramatic decrease in demand for the apartments in the
building (one may assume, for example, that the major employer in the area
moved recently), the best estimate of the cash flows from the apartment
building for the foreseeable future is $10,000 per year. A rational
purchaser determines the price she or he is willing to pay by reference to
the future cash flows ($10,000 in this case). It is irrelevant to today's price
that last year, in very different conditions from those anticipated in the
future, the cash flows from the apartment building were ten times the
amount anticipated for next year.
20
18. See id. at 12. In an example that is interesting for this paper, Brealey and Myers
start their discussion of present value by considering how one calculates the present value of
an apartment house that will be sold in one year for $400,000. Id. They show that the
present value in that case amounts to the expected cash flow from the apartment, which in
the example they assume is limited to the $400,000 that will be recognized upon sale,
discounted by an appropriate factor. Id. Thus, they show the discounted cash flow method
makes perfect sense to use even though the particular asset will be sold instead of used to
generate revenue over an extended period. Id.
19. See Mukesh Bajaj et al., Firm Value and Marketability Discounts, 27 J. CORP. L.
89, 91 (2001). This concept is basic to finance. Thus, for example, one group of authors
state, while writing about marketability discounts, that "the price of any asset is given by the
present value of the cash flows to be received from owning the asset." Id.
20. Obviously, in most, or at least many cases, prior performance will give good
evidence of what one might expect about the future. But, the important theory is that such
history is only evidence of present value (i.e., future cash flows) and not the basis of the
value. See SHANNON P. PRATT, ET AL., VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL
OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 36-37 (3d ed. 1996) (stating that while the theoretically
[Vol. 53:1
The Impact of Modern Finance Theory
2. Cash Flows; Not GAAP Earnings
Financial economists determine present value by reference to cash
flows and not by reference to net earnings computed under generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 2'
The difference between cash flows and net earnings under GAAP and
the reason present value is aptly determined by cash flows can be explained
by reference to non-cash expenses, such as depreciation. 22 Assume that in
each of the next five years a company with a significant capital asset
anticipates annual earnings before depreciation of $100 and annual
depreciation charges at $10, and the company anticipates that it will have to
replace the capital asset during the fifth year at a net cost of $50. Focusing
on the first five years, earnings under GAAP may be calculated at $90 per
year,23 while actual cash flows amount to $100 in each of the first four
years and $50 in year five.
24
Using GAAP earnings in this example misstates actual cash flows,
and importantly, misstates the real value being generated by the company
in each of the five years. 25 This is best seen by recognizing that in years
one through four the entire $100 in cash flows (not just $90 in GAAP
earnings) could be put to work at a positive rate of return (invested in T-
bills, for example). The impact of this mistake, of course, flips in year five
when the company generates cash flows of only $50 (instead of $90) to use
or distribute.
3. Cash Flows Include Cash Generated by the Sale of Assets
The cash flows that form the basis for present value of a business
include not only the profits from the normal operation of the business but
also revenues generated from the sale of any or all of the business's
correct manner of calculating value is to use future cash flows, courts must rely on evidence
and historical results, adjusted for reasonable expectations about future results, are often
more credible evidence than projections).
21. See BREALEY &MYERS, supra note 15, at 113-14.
22. See id. at 114.
23. The assumptions here are that an application of straight-line depreciation to the
capital assets results in a non-cash depreciation charge of $10 annually, which amount is:
then deducted from revenues in arriving at net profits for the year.
24. If one assumes a discount rate of ten percent, the present value of $90 in each of
the next five years amounts to $341, while the present value of $100 in each of the next four
years, and $50 in year five, amounts to $347.
25. Although their article is old, Blum and Katz provide an excellent explanation of
this. Walter J. Blum & Wilber G. Katz, Depreciation and Enterprise Valuation, 32 U. CI.
L. REv. 236, 236-42 (1965). See also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at 90 ("Cash flows
and accounting income are often very different.... [T]he accountant's decisions have
nothing to do with ... cash flow .... ).
2003]
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assets. 26 The point appears, perhaps, so obvious that it need not be stated,
but it can come into play in less apparent circumstances.
For example, a court might be asked to determine the present value of
a company that has net assets that could be sold one year hence for
$1,000,000. The same company, assume, if it were to continue to operate
under the same management, would likely earn annually $50,000 for as
long as one can foresee. In that case, the present value of the business
could be determined by assuming that the assets will be sold, in which case
present value would be calculated by reference to $50,000 that would be
earned in year one plus the $1,000,000 that might be received from the sale
of all the assets. Alternatively, present value could be determined by
assuming that the old managers will continue to operate the business, in
which case present value would be calculated by reference to the $50,000
to be received annually in perpettiity.
The court, of course, must first determine which of the alternative
factual assumptions to use; but whichever is selected, the valuation
methodology that the financial economist would use to put a present value
on the business is exactly the same. 27 In each case the cash flows would be
discounted.28 In the first instance the cash flows amount to the $50,000 to
be received in the first year plus the $1,000,000 to be received upon the
sale of the assets, and in the second instance the cash flows amount to
$50,000 to be received annually in perpetuity.
4. Cash Flows Include Only Amounts to Which the Party is Entitled
To determine present value of a party's interest in a business, one
considers only those cash flows to which the party is entitled. For example,
if one contracts to be a residual participant in the cash flows generated by a
business, as do the common shareholders of a corporation, the present
value of that participant's interest is determined by reference only to the
anticipated portion of the cash flows remaining after all prior claimants
have been paid.
To use a simple example, if a corporation has total annual revenues of
$100, wages to employees of $20, interest payments to creditors of $20 and
26. Brealey and Myers actually use such an example in one of their first basic
examples of the discounted cash flow methodology. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15,
at 11-12.
27. The author previously has written about how the court should determine which of
these factual assumptions it should use. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 134-52. Courts in
determining fair value and fair price should assume that managers will operate the company
in a value maximizing manner.
28. Id. at 67-72. See notes 15-18, supra, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53:1
2003] The Impact of Modern Finance Theory
no further expenses, the present value of the owners' interests in the
corporation would be determined by discounting $60. In that case, the
owners have contracted to be paid last among the other claimants and,
assuming the owners intend to make no changes in the situation, $60 is the
reasonable anticipation of their annual cash flows.
29
C. Discounting to Reflect the Time Value of Money and Risk
A stream of payments to be received over a period of time is worth
less than the sum of the payments. 30  For example, in our apartment
building example above, if one predicts that the apartment building will
generate cash flows of $100 per year for ten years and will at that point
have no further earning capacity and no salvage, then a rational investor
will not pay $1,000 (the sum of the cash flows) for the building.
One reason the investor will not give up $1,000 today for a promise to
repay an equal amount of dollars at some future time is because the
investor is giving up the use of her or his money for a period of time, which
means that the investor must defer consumption or forego a return on the
invested sum during the period of time before the investment is repaid.31
The investor, therefore, demands a return, because money has a "time
value." 32 The amount the investor demands as compensation for the time
value of money is referred to as the riskless rate of return, since it
represents the return demanded for investment that has no risk respecting
29. In calculating the return on an investment, such as common stock, financial
economists often consider only dividends. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at 59.
Alternatively, they may consider dividends plus growth in the value of the common stock.
Id. Thus, if a share of common stock pays a $1 dividend, and it sells at the beginning of a
period for $10 and sells for $11 at the end of the period, the return on the stock may be
calculated as the dividend ($1) plus the growth in value of the stock ($11 [ending price]
minus $10 [beginning price]), or $2, or a 20% return on the investment. Id. Cash flows may
amount to a sensible approximation of dividends plus growth and thus represent an
acceptable proxy for dividends plus growth in present value calculations. Id. at 63-72. This
is because the portion of cash flows not paid out in dividends is reinvested by management
for benefit of shareholders and, assuming proper investment criteria, should generate future
value from the investment at least equal to the present value of the reinvested retained
earnings. Id. at 67-72.
30. In their introduction to present value, Brealey and Myers provide a simple
articulation of this point. See id. at 12-14.
31. See id. at 12 (rate of return includes "the reward that investors demand for
accepting delayed payment"). Later in their book, the authors engage in a more
sophisticated consideration of the riskless rate of return and its relationship to total market
risk. Id. at 147 (advancing the notion that the riskless rate of return should be based on "the
current interest rate on Treasury bills").
32. See id. at 68-69.
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the future return.
33
In addition to the riskless rate, the rational investor will demand an
additional amount for any risk that is present in an investment.34 Risk is
generally understood as volatility or variability of possible outcomes.
35
Thus, the more volatile an investment or, stated differently, the wider the
dispersion of possible outcomes from the investment, the more risk in the
investment and the more return an investor demands.36  The additional
return over and above the riskless rate of return that an investor demands
for such volatility is referred to as the risk premium.
37
Financial economists, therefore, will essentially build a discount rate
by first determining the appropriate riskless rate of return and then adding
to that rate an appropriate risk premium. 38  The first part of this -
determining the riskless rate of return - is typically done by reference to
government securities, such as treasury bills.39 It is in the determination of
the appropriate risk premium, however, where financial economists begin
to disagree with one another. 40
During the last three decades, the theory of the risk premium that has
most dominated the discussion among financial economists has been the
capital asset pricing model. 4 1 Under this theory, the risk premium required
for an investment in a particular stock is generally considered to involve
only a premium for the systematic or market risk, which is the risk that
cannot be eliminated by diversification.42  The risk premium under the
capital asset pricing model is calculated by multiplying the average market-
33. Id. at 173-94.
34. Brealey and Myers state as a "basic financial principle" that "[a] safe dollar is
worth more than a risky one." Id. at 13.
35. Brealey and Myers introduce volatility risk in chapter two of their text, but reserve
a more complete treatment for chapters seven through nine. Id. at 12-17, 147-235.
36. Although an older work, Wilbur Lewellen provides an excellent explanation of the
psychology and economic underpinnings for the demand by investors that they be paid for
accepting volatility risk. WILBUR G. LEWELLEN, THE COST OF CAPITAL 8-18 (1969). Brealey
and Myers provide a discussion of the historical relationship between variability in
outcomes and market return on investments. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at 144-48.
37. Brealey and Myers report, for example, that from 1926 through 1994, the average
risk premiums on government bonds was 1.4%, on corporate bonds was 2.0%, on the S&P
500 was 8.4%, and on small-firm common stocks was 13.7%. BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 15, at 146 tbl.7.
38. Id. at 147.
39. See id. at 146 tbl.7-1.
40. Id. at 148.
41. The capital asset pricing model is described in BREALEY & MEYERS, supra, note 15,
at 178-88, 990 (A brief definition.).
42. Id. at 159-60, 173-88.
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wide risk premium by the company's beta.43  Beta is a measure of the
sensitivity of an individual security to market movements.
44
The capital asset pricing model is also an integral part of the weighted
average cost of capital method for determining a discount rate. 4 . Under
this method, one first determines the company's cost of equity capital,
normally by using the capital asset pricing model.46 Then, the company's
cost of debt is determined, typically by estimating what the company is
required to pay for its borrowed money.47  The cost of the company's
equity and its debt are then weighted by the percentages of the company's
total capitalization represented by each of the two components,48 and this
weighted average cost of capital is used to discount the company's cash
flows before any deduction for interest payments.49 The result is a present
value for the entire stream of earnings or cash flows that are available to
service the company's debt and for shareholders.50 In essence, one ends up
with a present value for the company's debt and equity.51 Finally, in the
typical situation in which the issue is the value of the junior equity, the
value of the company's debt is subtracted out, which leaves the value of the
shareholders' interest in the company.
52
In more recent times, the capital asset pricing model has been
challenged by a number of economists, 53 and alternative theories have been54
proposed.54 Nonetheless, the capital asset pricing model continues to have
43. See id. at 180 ("Expected risk premium on stock = beta x expected risk premium on
market.").
44. Id. at 162, 182.
45. See, e.g., CEDE & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, at
28 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (Expert, Professor Rappaport, "used a weighted cost of capital"
and apparently used the capital asset pricing model as the basis for computing the
company's cost of equity).
46. Id.
47. Thompson, supra note 8, at 522-23; see also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at
517.
48. Thompson, supra note 8, at 522-23; see also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at
517-18.
49. Thompson, supra note 8, at 524; see also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at
518-19.
50. Thompson, supra note 8, at 524.
51. Id. at 524-25.
52. Thompson, supra note 8, at 523-25; see also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at
517-21.
53. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at 183-88.
54. See id. at 188-94. Brealey and Myers include in their discussion of alternate
theories the "consumption capital asset pricing model." Id. at 189-90, 195. ("suggest[ing]
that security risk reflects the sensitivity of returns to changes in investors' consumption").
And the "arbitrage pricing theory." Id at 190-91, 195. ("Expected risk premium on a stock
should depend on the stock's exposure to several pervasive macroeconomic factors.").
2003]
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its defenders55 and continues to draw significant coverage in standard
corporate finance treatises. 56  Brealey and Myers, for example, devote
many pages to the capital asset pricing model and its factual and theoretical
underpinnings and ramifications. 57 At one point in their text, they describe
the capital asset pricing theory as "the best-known model of risk and
return," stating further that the theory is "plausible and widely used.",
58
One should, however, be clear both about the limited nature of this
debate and about the areas of present value theory that are the subject of
broad agreement among financial economists. The debate here is focused
solely on the risk premium and the matter of whether the relationship
between risk and return is best captured by the capital asset pricing model
or some alternate theory, such as the consumption capital asset pricing
model or the arbitrage pricing theory. 59 This debate does not cast doubt on
the findamental soundness of the discounted cash flow valuation method
or the other components of that method that were discussed above.
Finally, even within the limited debate about how one should
calculate a risk premium, we have, in addition to popular theories, an
enormous amount of historical data. We know, for example, that over the
last seventy or so years, the average risk premium that the market has
extracted for investments in corporate bonds has averaged about 2.0%.60
Over the same time period the average risk premium on the S&P 500 has
been 8.4% and on small corporations has been about 13.7%.61 Certainly
55. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 519-20 (discussing some of the defenders of the
capital asset pricing model).
56. See GRIGHAM ET AL., supra note 16, at 178, 212.
57. See BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 15, at 182-90.
58. Id. at 194. The authors immediately add, however, that the capital asset pricing
model is "far from perfect. Actual returns are related to beta over the long run, but the
relationship is not as strong as the CAPM predicts, and other factors seem to explain returns
better since the mid-1960s." Id. And finally Brealey and Myers state that:
The capital asset pricing model captures these ideas [about risk and return] in a
simple way.... But that doesn't mean that the capital asset pricing model is
ultimate truth. [That theory]. . . has several unsatisfactory features .... Nobody
knows whether [an alternative theory for measuring risk] ... is eventually going
to come out on top or whether there are other, better models of risk and return that
have not yet seen the light of day."
Id. at 184. But, the authors add that "[i]t will be very hard to reject the CAPM beyond all
reasonable doubt." Id. at 188.
59. Brealey and Myers, perhaps, best sum this up when they report that, while "[e]ach
of these different models of risk and return has its fan club[,] ... all financial economists
agree on two basic ideas: (1) Investors require extra expected return for taking on risk, and
(2) they appear to be concerned predominately with the risk that they cannot eliminate by
diversification." Id. at 195. See also id. at 185-88.
60. Id. at 146.
61. Id.
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these numbers provide at least "benchmarks" for the determination of risk
premiums.
62
D. Summary Statements
The purpose for this section, as stated at the outset, is to provide a
theoretical framework for the balance of the article. Also, however, this
section is intended to provide evidence of the broad agreement among most
financial economists today about most matters of present value.
II. THE CATEGORIES OF METHODOLOGIES
The data presented in Section III of this paper are organized around
five valuation methodologies and one catch-all category.63  Brief
descriptions of these categories of valuation methodologies follow.
A. Discounted Cash Flow Value
This methodology is described in Section I of this paper. To repeat
briefly, one calculates the discounted cash flow value of a company by
estimating the cash flows of the company and discounting those cash flows
by a factor that reflects both the time value of money (the riskless rate of
return) and risk (the risk premium). 64
B. Asset Value
"Asset value" amounts to the market value of the net assets of the
62. Brealey and Myers refer to these numbers as "benchmarks for the opportunity cost
of capital." Id. at 166. They go on to explain: "If we are evaluating a safe project, we
discount at the current risk-free rate of interest. If we are evaluating a project of average
risk, we discount at the expected return on the average common stock .... Id.
63. Not surprisingly, categorizing the cases was difficult in some instances. In the first
place, the categories are not always crisp. Perhaps this is best explained by reference to the
comparative ratio methodology. See infra discussion accompanying notes 75-77. Of the
five categories established in the article, the comparative ratio methodology is the softest
around its edges. For example, if under the comparative ratio methodology, one uses a
current price-earnings ratio of an actively traded comparable company as part of the
valuation, the methodology begins to look like the discounted cash flow methodology.
Also, to the extent that the comparative ratio methodology results in multiple values being
rendered, some weighting of the factors is likely necessary, and the methodology begins to
look like the weighted average methodology. See infra discussion accompanying notes 78-
83, for a description of the weighted average methodology.
Generally, however, the cases fell easily into the categories, and thus the number of
close calls was small. Especially in light of the depth of the data, the proportion of "softer"
cases seems relatively non-distortive.
64. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at 35.
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company.65 In this valuation method, therefore, the evaluator calculates the
fair market value that the assets of the company would bring in the event of
liquidation and subtracts from that -figure the liabilities of the company.
66
A couple of points should be made in order to establish the distinct
nature of this methodology. First, asset value is determined by the
liquidation value of the assets and not by the going concern value of the
assets as presently deployed by the company and its managers. 67 In other
words, asset value is essentially an opportunity cost measure of the value of
the company's assets and thus amounts to the most valuable alternate use
of the assets. 68 It is possible, therefore, that the asset value of a company
could exceed the company's going concern value.
69
The second point is that an asset value methodology does not involve
applying any multiple or discount to the net liquidation value of the
company's assets. Asset value is merely the amount that the company
would bring, if all the assets were sold and all the debts were paid.70 So,
for example, if an evaluator were to propose to value a company at 1.3
times its net asset value or, what one sees more often, to value a company
at 1.3 times its book value, those would not be categorized in this paper as
an asset valuation.
71
C. Deal Value
In this methodology, a company's value is established by reference to
the price at which similar companies were acquired.72 So, for example, if
Petroleum Company A were recently acquired at a price of 1.8 times its
book value, Petroleum Company B might be valued at 1.8 times its book
value. Or, if the acquisition price for Company A were fifteen times its
most recently reported earnings, a claim may be made that Company B
should be valued at fifteen times its most recent earnings.
The critical distinguishing aspect here is that deal value prices off the
acquisition of a comparable company. Thus to the extent that the price of
the comparable acquisition involved the acquiring company's paying for
65. See PRATT, supra note 20, at 254-56.
66. See, e.g., Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 140 (Del. 1980).
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., id. at 145-47 (the court determined that the earnings value of the Kirby
Lumber Company was $120 per share but that the asset value of Kirby was $456 per share).
70. See id.
71. These types of valuations may be part of a comparative ratio valuation. See infra
discussion accompanying note 77.
72. See, e.g., PRATT, supra note 20, at 243-45.
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the synergy created in that particular deal,73 the application of the deal
value methodology to the transaction under consideration impounds the
value of that synergy into the valuation of the company under
consideration.
74
D. Comparative Ratio Value
An evaluator using the comparative ratio valuation methodology bases
its valuation on certain key ratios derived from comparable companies that
are actively traded in the market and that are not being acquired.75
Significant trading activity in the comparable stock is necessary to ensure
that the pricing of the comparable stock is efficient and that data about the
comparable stock is readily available.
The ratios from the comparable company are constructed using the
market price of the comparable's stock over various financial data from the
comparable company. These financial data may include: (a) total revenues,
(b) book value, (c) earnings, (d) earnings before deducting certain
expenses, such as interest and taxes (EBIT) or interest, taxes, depreciation
and amortization (EBITDA).76 For example, if the present trading price of
a computer manufacturer, C Co., is two times its total revenues, then under
this methodology one might claim that the fair value of another computer
manufacturer, D Co., should be two times D Co.'s total revenues.
Similarly, if the present trading price of C Co.'s stock is 1.5 times its book
value, then one may consider D Co. to have a fair value of 1.5 times its (D
Co.'s) book value. Using this methodology, one may wind up with more
than one valuation. For example, one may wind up with valuations that are
multiples of the company's total revenues, its book value, its EBIT, etc. In
such cases, the evaluator is obliged either to blend the various values in
some fashion or to select one of the values to predominate.
77
73. See, e.g., RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 300-04 (2d ed. 1995). Studies support the conclusion that a
majority of the synergy generated in an acquisition often goes to the shareholders of the
acquired company, especially when the sale occurs in a vigorous market for corporate
control. 1d. at 300-02.
74. PRATT, supra note 20, at 243.
75. See, e.g., PRATT, supra note 20, at 206:
76. See, e.g., PRATT, supra note 20, at 207-08; Harris v. Rapid Am. Corp., No. CIV.A.
6462, 1990 WL 146488, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1990).
77. See Harris v. Rapid-Am. Corp., No. Civ. A. 6462, 1990 WL 146488, at *3-4 (Del.
Ch. 1990), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992) (affirming use of
comparative ratio valuation methodology, but remanding for consideration of other issues).
In that case, the Chancery Court computed ratios from publicly traded companies market
value of invested capital to the following factors: earnings before interest and taxes;
earnings before depreciation, interest and taxes; revenues; and tangible book value of
2003]
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E. Weighted Average Value
The old Delaware block method 78 is the most commonly used
weighted average valuation technique. There, for example, the evaluator
considers up to four separate factors of value and then arrives at a final
valuation by weighting each of the factors. 79 The factors typically found in
a Delaware block evaluation are: (1) asset value, (2) market value, (3)
earnings value, and (4) dividend value. 80 The weights assigned to the
factors vary from case to case,81 and, indeed, not all of the four factors are
accorded weight in all cases. Dividend value, for example, is the particular
element of value that is omitted from consideration most often.
8 2
The weighted average valuation category includes not only the
Delaware block cases but also cases in which factors outside the traditional
four factors of the Delaware block method are used. Le Beau v. M.G.
Bancororation, Inc. is an example.83  In that case a party valued the
company by computing a discounted cash flow value and a comparative
ratio value and then blended these values into its final valuation estimate by
weighting each factor at fifty percent.
84
F. Other Valuation Methods
A catch-all category is established for methodologies that do not fit
into any of the five discrete categories described above.
invested capitals. Id. at *9-10. Each of the ratios was applied to comparable financial data
from Rapid-American, and the results from the individual factors were weighted to arrive at
the final valuation. Id. at *3-18.
78. Two somewhat older student works provide an excellent look at the ways courts
applied the Delaware block method. See Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under
Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1453, 1467 (1966); J. Steven Rogers, Note, 30 OKLA.
L. REV. 629, 641-42 (1977).
79. Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1453, 1457-71 (1966).
80. Id.
81. VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON, BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN'S
CORPORATE FINANCE CASES AND MATERIALS 708-09 (4th ed. 1993). The authors build on a
prior student note, by J. Steven Rogers, The Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, to
provide an evaluation of the weights assigned by courts in utilizing the Delaware block
approach. Rogers, supra note 78, at 641-42. Out of the eighteen decisions involved in their
survey, the average weight accorded to asset value was 36.0%. The average weight
accorded market value was 23.1% and earnings value was 39.0%. Id.
82. See, BRUDNEY & BRATTON, supra note 81, at 708-09. Out of the eighteen cases
utilizing the Delaware block approach reported by Brudney & Bratton, dividend value was
accorded positive weight in only two of the cases. Id. at 709.
83. No. Civ. A. 13414, 1998 WL 44993, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998).
84. Id. at *4.
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III. COURT DECISIONS
This section presents data regarding the valuation methodologies used
by courts in acquisition cases. As stated at the outset of this piece, the
population of cases from which the data is extracted is made up of seventy-
six acquisition cases from all jurisdictions decided since Weinberger in
which the fair price or the fair value of the acquisition was challenged by a
party and the court was, as a result, required to determine the value of the
corporation that was the subject of the transaction.
Table 1 shows the data as a whole and thus includes cases from all
jurisdictions and all time periods. Table 2 through Table 9 break the data
into sub-populations of cases to show differences between Delaware and
non-Delaware cases and between cases decided within the first eight years
after Weinberger and cases decided thereafter.
Table 10 through Table 18 present data limited to cases in which
courts used a discounted cash flow methodology as a basis for their
valuations and show how those courts determined both the cash flows and
the discount rates they used.85
A. Methodologies Utilized by Courts: All Jurisdictions; All Periods
Table 1 reflects the valuation methodologies used by courts in the
entire population of cases.
85. See Appendix
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TABLE 1: METHODOLOGIES ACCEPTED BY COURTS:
ALL JURISDICTIONS; ALL PERIODS
SINCE WEINBERGER
8 6
DISCOUNTED ASSET DEAL COMPARATIVE WEIGHTED
CASH FLOW VALUE VALUE RATIO AVERAGE
PERCENTAGE'
FRACTION
31% 20% 3% 7% 30% 10%
24/77 15/77 2/77 5/77 23/77 8/77
'Rounding causes total percentage to be more than 100%.
In considering the Table, one may first be struck by the dispersion of
outcomes. No single methodology was utilized by the courts in a majority
of the cases or, indeed, even in close to a majority of the cases. Each of the
three most popular valuation methodologies - discounted cash flow
method, asset value method and weighted average method - was utilized
by courts in roughly between twenty percent and thirty percent of the cases.
The utilization rate drops off precipitously after that, but considered
together, the other three categories account for a total of approximately
twenty percent of the decisions. Courts, therefore, seem to take seriously
the flexibility that they typically have in selecting from various valuation
methodologies.
Focusing next on the particular utilization rates for the highest use
methodologies, one finds, first of all, that the discounted cash flow
methodology was used by the courts in slightly less than one-third of all the
cases. This number may be surprisingly low in light of the broad
acceptance of the discounted cash flow methodology among financial
86. In Table I, the useable number of cases is seventy-one. See Appendix. In some of
those cases, however, courts employed more than one valuation methodology. An example
of this is the case of Robbins and Co. v. A.C. Israel Enter., Inc., where the court valued three
different components of the company by three different methodologies. No. C.A. 7919,
1985 WL 149627, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1985) (market value methodology used to value
common stock held as investment); id. at *7-8 (discounted cash flow methodology used to
value debentures held as investment); id, at *8-9 (asset value used to place an overall value
on the company). Each of the three chosen methodologies is recorded separately in the
Table. Also in one case, Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, the court evaluated two companies
separately, and the methodologies in that single case are recorded separately as well. No..
CIV.A. 7959, 1988 WL 15816, at *10-31 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1988). Thus, in Table 1,
although the Table is based on seventy-one cases, courts made a total of seventy-seven
choices respecting valuation methods. Choices by courts are considered a better reflection
of actual use than number of cases, and the numbers in Tables 1-9 are so constructed.
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economists.8 7  One might have imagined that the- discounted cash flow
method would have made more of an inroad in the nearly twenty years
since Weinberger turned away from the exclusive use of the Delaware
block approach and thus seemed to open the door for the absorption of
sound financial theory into the law of acquisitions.
Table I also demonstrates that the weighted average methodology has
had a significant life after Weinberger, being relied on by courts in thirty
percent of the all cases. Once again, one may be surprised at the reluctance
of courts to dispatch this unsound methodology. 
88
Finally, one may not have expected to find courts in twenty-percent of
all cases using an asset value methodology. Courts uniformly, and properly
so,89 reject liquidation value in favor of going concern value as the proper
measure of fair value or fair price,90 and it is difficult to square this
articulated aversion with the fact that courts utilized an asset based
valuation in one-fifth of the cases in the population.
91
In summary, if one is convinced that the discounted cash flow
methodology best reflects modem finance theory, the outcomes from these
cases are not encouraging. Courts in less than one-third of their opinions
used that favored methodology, while continuing to rely to a significant
degree on the weighted average methodology and the asset value
methodology. Indeed, these latter two problematic valuation
methodologies considered together were accepted by courts in one-half of
the cases from the population.
92
87. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., CEDE & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 297 (Del. 1996)
(Liquidation value not appropriate as sole measure of fair value); In re Shell Oil Co., 607
A.2d 1213, 1219 (Del. 1992) (same); Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802 (Del.
1992) (same). In Delaware, this rule predated Weinberger. See, e.g., Tri-Continental Corp.,
74 A.2d at 72.
91. See Appendix.
92. See Appendix.
The low acceptance rate for a deal value methodology may be related to the fact that
most of the cases in the population were appraisal cases. The popular rhetoric is that,
appraisal rights do not entitle dissenting shareholders to share in the synergy generated by
the transaction. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 122-27. Because deal value prices off
acquisitions of entire companies, deal value would, by definition, contain synergy. See, e.g.,
Bernard Black & Joseph Grundfest, Shareholder Gains from Takeovers and Restructuring
Between 1981 and 1986, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 5 (1988) ("There is no shortage of research
demonstrating takeover premiums averaging 30-50%."). At least one case provides support
for the idea that the synergy in deal value pricing makes deal value an inappropriate method
for establishing appraisal value. See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. CIV.A.
11107, 1995 WL 376911, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jun. 15, 1995) (rejecting deal value in appraisal
proceedings "because it reflects value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
2003]
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B. Methodologies Utilized by Courts: All Jurisdictions;
Separated by Periods
Table 2 and Table 3 separate the data into earlier and later cases.
Table 2 shows the valuation methodologies accepted by courts in all
jurisdictions from the date of the Weinberger decision until January 1,
1991, and Table 3 shows the valuation methods accepted by courts in
decisions after January 1, 1991.
There is nothing remarkable about the eight year time period in Table
2. Instead, it was chosen as a rough approximation of a period of time that
might allow the Weinberger decision an opportunity to be absorbed into the
judicial marketplace of ideas. The point here is to see whether or not, as
time passes, courts move to valuation methods more consistent with
modem finance theory.
TABLE 2: METHODOLOGIES ACCEPTED BY COURTS:
CASES FROM ALL JURISDICTIONS DECIDED
BETWEEN WEINBERGER AND JANUARY 1, 199193
PERCENTAGE
FRACTION
DISCOUNTED ASSET DEAL COMPARATIVE WEIGHTED
CASH FLOW . VALUE VALUE RATIO 
AVERAGE
24% 29% 0% 3% 29% 15%
8/34 10/34 0/34 1/34 10/34 5/34
merger").
The Table also shows that the comparative ratio analysis did not fare well with courts.
In fact, three of the entries in the author's population of comparative ratio cases were from
the various court opinions in a single case. See generally Harris v. Rapid-Am. Corp., No.
CIV.A. 6462, 1990 WL 146488 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 603
A.2d 796 (Del. Jan. 23, 1992), remanded, 1992 WL 69614 (Del. Ch. Apr. 6, 1992). If those
three opinions were counted only once, instead of three times, the acceptance rate for the
comparative ratio analysis would be reduced to an even more modest seven percent.
93. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 3: METHODOLOGIES ACCEPTED BY COURTS:
CASES FROM ALL JURISDICTIONS DECIDED
AFTER JANUARY 1, 199194
DISCOUNTED ASSET DEAL COMPARATIVE WEIGHTED OTHER
CASH FLOW VALUE VALUE RATIO AVERAGE
PERCENTAGE
FRACTION
37% 12% 5% 9% 30% 7%
16/43 5/43 2/43 4/43 13/43 3/43
First, comparing Table 2 to Table 3, one finds in the later period an
increased reliance on the discounted cash flow method and a decreased
reliance on asset value, and both of these changes suggest positive
movement. On the negative side, however, the weighted average
utilization rate remained essentially unchanged in the two periods. The data
considered as a whole, therefore, suggest modest progress toward the use of
better valuation methodologies.
Focusing on Table 3 by itself as a way to evaluate how courts have
behaved in more recent times, the data suggest that we still have a long way
to go to come to a proper use of modem finance theory. Table 3 shows that
during the more recent period only about one in three cases (thirty-seven
percent) was decided using the discounted cash flow method, while thirty
percent of the cases were decided under the weighted average method and a
total of forty-two percent of the cases were decided under the weighted
average method and the asset valuation method considered together.
Viewed broadly, therefore, the data in Tables 2 and 3 suggest modest
progress toward an appropriate use of modem finance theory and a
situation in the latter period that is far from ideal.
C. Methodologies Utilized by Courts: In Delaware
and Non-Delaware Cases
Because of the significance of Delaware to corporations and corporate
law, the data are now divided into Delaware cases and non-Delaware cases.
Of the seventy-six useable decisions in the population of cases forty-
one (fifty-four percent) are from Delaware state courts, and thirty-five
(forty-six percent) are from non-Delaware courts. Thus, while these
numbers do indicate the significance of Delaware, they also indicate that
94. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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one should resist any urge to write off other jurisdictions as being of no
material consequence.
Table 4 shows the methodologies utilized by Delaware courts in cases
decided since Weinberger. Table 5 shows the methodologies utilized by
non-Delaware courts in cases decided since Weinberger.
TABLE 4: DELAWARE CASES: METHODOLOGIES
ACCEPTED BY DELAWARE COURTS IN ALL
PERIODS AFTER WEINBERGER
9 5
DISCOUNTED ASSET DEAL COMPARATIVE WEIGHTED OTHER
CASH FLOW VALUE VALUE RATIO AVERAGE
PERCENTAGE'
FRACTION
2
49% 19% 5% 7% 14% 7%
21/43 8/43 2/43 3/43 6/43 3/43
IRounding causes total percentage to be more than 100%2One decision is counted twice because it involved two separate valuation opinions on two
separate corporations.
TABLE 5: NON-DELAWARE CASES: METHODOLOGIES
ACCEPTED BY NON-DELAWARE COURTS IN
ALL PERIODS AFTER WEINBERGER
96
DISCOUNTED ASSET DEAL COMPARATIVE WEIGHTED OTHER
CASH FLOW VALUE VALUE RATIO AVERAGE
PERCENTAGE'
FRACTION
9% 21% 0% 6% 50% 15%
3/34 7/34 0/34 2/34 17/34 5/34
'Rounding causes total percentage to be more than 100%.
Comparing Table 4 and Table 5, the data suggest, not surprisingly,
that Delaware courts have made better use of modem finance theory than
have non-Delaware courts. This is shown, for example, by Delaware's
relatively higher use of the discounted cash flow methodology and its
95. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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relative lower use of the weighted average methodology. Interestingly, the
asset value methodology was the second most popular both in and outside
of Delaware and was used in approximately the same percentage of cases
in both.
The differences in the utilization rates in the two Tables also suggest
that other jurisdictions are not paying much attention to what is going on in
Delaware. Any unique importance of the Delaware cases, therefore, seems
more the result of the number of large corporations incorporated in
Delaware and less the result of the influence of Delaware's jurisprudence
on her sister states.
D. Methodologies Utilized by Courts: In Earlier Cases and
In More Recent Cases
The Delaware and non-Delaware sub-populations are now re-divided
by time periods. The purposes here are to show whether courts in each of
the two sub-populations have, over time, changed the methodologies they
use to determine present value and also to show the methodologies that
courts have used in their more recent decisions.
These re-divided sub-populations get somewhat thin and must be
evaluated accordingly.
1. Delaware Cases
Tables 6 and 7 report the Delaware cases. Table 6 indicates the
valuation methodologies accepted by Delaware courts in the period
between the Weinberger decision and January 1, 1991. Table 7 indicates
the valuation methodologies accepted by Delaware courts in cases decided
thereafter.
2003]
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TABLE 6: DELAWARE CASES: METHODOLOGIES
ACCEPTED BY DELAWARE COURTS IN CASES
DECIDED BETWEEN WEINBERGER AND
JANUARY 1, 199197
DISCOUNTED ASSET DEAL COMPARATIVE WEIGHTED OTHER
CASH FLOW VALUE VALUE RATIO AVERAGE
PERC
FRA
PERC
FRA
CENTAGE
CTION
44% 31% 0% 6% 13% 6%
7/16 5/16 0/16 1/16 2/16 1/16
TABLE 7: DELAWARE CASES: METHODOLOGIES
ACCEPTED BY DELAWARE COURTS IN CASES
DECIDED AFTER JANUARY 1, 199198
DISCOUNTED ASSET DEAL COMPARATIVE WEIGHTED OTHER
CASH FLOW VALUE VALUE RATIO AVERAGE
ENTAGE
CTION
52% 11% 7% 7% 15% 7%
14/27 3/27 2/27 2/27 4/27 2/27
'Rounding causes total percentage to be less than 100%.
Comparing Table 6 to Table 7, the data suggest modest gains in the
better selection of valuation methodologies. Thus, Delaware courts in the
most recent period modestly increased their use of the discounted cash flow
methodology and decreased their reliance on the asset value method. Their
use of the weighted average method of valuation essentially remained
unchanged between the two periods.
Table 7 considered by itself may be the most interesting to many,
because it reports the more recent cases from the most important
jurisdiction. The Table indicates that during this period Delaware courts
relied on the discounted cash flow method in approximately one-half of
their cases. While this data may at first seem encouraging, and certainly it
97. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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is better than the utilization rate for cases from all periods and all
jurisdictions, as reported in Table 1, one might be less than fully satisfied
with a situation in which one-half of the decisions were based on
methodologies other than discounted cash flows and approximately one-
fourth of all the cases were decided under either the asset value method or
the weighted average method.
2. Non-Delaware Cases
Table 8 shows the valuation methodologies accepted by non-Delaware
courts in cases decided between the Weinberger decision and January 1,
1991. Table 9 shows the valuation methodologies accepted by non-
Delaware courts in cases decided thereafter.
TABLE 8: NON-DELAWARE CASES: METHODOLOGIES
ACCEPTED BY NON-DELAWARE COURTS IN
CASES DECIDED BETWEEN WEINBERGER AND
JANUARY 1, 199199
DISCOUNTED ASSET DEAL COMPARATIVE WEIGHTED OTHER
CASH FLOW VALUE VALUE RATIO AVERAGE
PERC
FRAC
PERC
FRAC
ENTAGE
TION
6% 28% 0% 0% 44% 22%
1/18 5/18 0/18 0/18 8/18 4/18
TABLE 9: NON-DELAWARE CASES: METHODOLOGIES
ACCEPTED BY NON-DELAWARE COURTS IN
CASES DECIDED AFTER JANUARY 1, 1991100
DISCOUNTED ASSET DEAL COMPARATIVE WEIGHTED OTHER
CASH FLOW VALUE VALUE RATIO AVERAGE
ENTAGE
t
'TION
99. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
13% 13% 0% 13% 56% 6%
2/16 2/16 0/16 2/16 9/16 1/16
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'Rounding causes total percentage to be more than 100%.
Comparing Table 8 and Table 9, and even allowing for the thinness of
the data, one finds little basis for material encouragement. On the positive
side are the modest increase in the utilization of the discounted cash flow
method and the modest decrease in the use of the asset value and the
weighted average considered together. Any encouragement from these
factors, however, is more than offset by the increased use of the weighted
average method during the most recent period.
Now focusing on Table 9 by itself, one finds non-Delaware courts in
the more recent period relying on the discounted cash flow method in only
about one in ten cases, while utilizing the weighted average method in
slightly over one-half of its decisions. These data suggest the extent to
which non-Delaware courts under utilize modem finance theory in their
acquisition cases.
E. Methodologies Utilized by Courts: Matters Involving
the Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
This section offers data respecting certain theoretical issues that are
critical to the discounted cash flow methodology.10' The discussion and
presentation of data are organized around the two principal components of
the discounted cash flow analysis - cash flows and the discount rate.
1. Cash Flows
a. Projected vs. Historical
As previously discussed, financial economists compute present value
by reference to future cash flows and not past cash flows." 2 One might
anticipate, therefore, that this broadly agreed upon, simple notion would
find its way into cases, especially in light of the fact that in the Weinberger
case Delaware abandoned the mandatory use of historical earnings in its
present value calculations. 
0 3
101. See Appendix. The population of cases on which this section is based includes
cases in which the courts have accepted the discounted cash flow method and cases in which
courts have used the discounted cash flow method as part of another valuation methodology,
such as, for example, cases in which the earnings value component of the weighted average
methodology is determined by using the discounted cash flow methodology.
102. See supra the discussion accompanying notes 19 and 20.
103. Prior to Weinberger, Delaware courts were required to use historical earnings in
valuation computations. See, e.g., Application of Delaware Racing, 213 A.2d 203, 212
(Del. 1965) (citing, Cottrell v. Paweatuck Co. 128 A.2d 225 "Delaware law requires that
earnings value be determined on the basis of historical earnings rather than on the basis of
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The empirical data, as reflected in Table 10, support the conclusion
that courts in most, but not all, cases rely on projected cash flows as the
basis for valuation under the discounted cash flow method.
TABLE 10: PROJECTED OR HISTORICAL CASH FLOWS:
ALL JURISDICTIONS; ALL PERIODS SINCE
WEINBERGER
PROJECTED CASH FLOWS HISTORICAL CASH FLOWS
PERCENTAGE 70% 30%
FRACTION 23/33 10/33
b. Projection Period: Perpetual and Its Proxies
All future cash flows, no matter how distant, have some present value.
The timing of those cash flows, however, determines the amount of their
present value. The sooner the cash flows are recognized, the higher their
present value.104 Courts utilizing projected cash flows as .a basis for
valuation are required, therefore, to make judgments or indulge
assumptions about the duration and timing of future cash flows.
Regarding the duration of the projected cash flows, in nearly all cases
courts with little discussion appear to assume the equivalent of a perpetual
stream of cash flows for the company. Thus, if one looks at all twenty of
the useable cases reported in Table 11, for example, one finds that all of the
decisions were based essentially on assumptions of a perpetual stream of
- 105earnings.
prospective earni'ngs."). Id. Weinberger freed courts from this mandatory rule. Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 713 (courts are free to use "any techniques or methods [of valuation] which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community .... ). Id. Even before
Weinberger, however, Delaware courts sometimes appeared to reject this wrong-headed rule
and to use projected earnings as a part of their present value analysis. Thus, in David J.
Greene Co. v. Dunhill Inc., for example, after recognizing that "[i]t is settled law in
Delaware that earnings value is to be determined on the basis of past and not on prospective
earnings," the Delaware Chancery Court went on to add that it was not "obliged to blindly
use past earnings without reference to other factors of record." 249 A.2d 427, 433 (Del. Ch.
1968).
104. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
105. All the cases reported in Table II essentially use an assumption of a perpetual
cash flow. The case under the "Perpetual Cash Flows" heading is obviously using this
20031
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Courts do, however, employ different conventions or proxies to deal
with the difficulties inherent in any estimate into perpetuity. Thus Table 11
reports that in most cases courts estimate perpetual cash flows by
projecting annual cash flows for a finite period and adding a terminal value
equal to the anticipated value of the company at the end of the finite period.
The terminal value, therefore, becomes a proxy for the value of the annual
cash flows starting at the end of the finite period and extending into
perpetuity.
TABLE 11: CALCULATION OF CASH FLOWS: ALL
JURISDICTIONS; ALL PERIODS SINCE
WEINBERGER
FINITE CASH FLOWS, FINITE CASH FLOWS,
PERPETUAL CASH FLOWS PLUS TERMINAL VALUE WITHOUT TERMINAL
VALUE
PERCENTAGE 20% 75% 5%
FRACTION 4/20 15/20 1/20
Looking at cases in which courts project cash flows by use of a finite
period plus a terminal value, Table 12 shows that courts use differing finite
periods, but five years is the length of time most often used by courts. 106
assumption. The cases under "Finite Cash Flows, Plus Terminal Value" include in the
"Terminal Value" the present value of all discounted cash flow beyond the final year in the
base period. Finally, in the one case from Table I 1 in which the court used a "Finite Cash
Flows, without Terminal Value", which case was TV58 Ltd. Partnership v. Weigel Broad.
Co., the Court adopted the work of an expert, Cheen, who projected earnings for a finite
period and did not add any terminal value. No. CIV.A. 10798, 1993 WL 285850, at *7
(Del. Ch. July 22, 1993). But, the court pointed out that Cheen "employs a lower discount
rate than that used in traditional discounted cash flow model, primarily because it does not
consider the factor of residual value." Id. Thus, the court essentially gave value to the post-
base period cash flows by lowering the discount rate.
106. Brealey & Myers comment that "valuation horizons are often chosen arbitrarily."
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at 76. They then use six years in one of their examples.
Id.
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TABLE 12: NUMBER OF YEARS IN FINITE PROJECTIONS:
ALL JURISDICTIONS; ALL PERIODS SINCE
WEINBERGER
PERCENTAGE1
FRACTION
3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 7 Years 13 Years
7% 7% 67% 13% 7%
1/15 1/15 10/15 2/15 1/15
'Rounding causes total percentage to be more than 100%.
Courts also often differ in the way they establish the terminal value of
a company. Nonetheless, as Table 13 indicates, courts in most of the cases
determine terminal value by capitalizing the projected cash flow in the last
year of the base period.
10 7
TABLE 13: TERMINAL VALUE CALCULATIONS: ALL
JURISDICTIONS; ALL PERIODS SINCE
WEINBERGER
DISCOUNTING ALL DISCOUNTING BASED
PROJECTED POST-BASE ON HISTORIC, PRE-
PERIOD CASH FLOWS MERGER CASH FLOWS
CAPITALIZING PROJECTED
CASH FLOWS ANTICIPATED
IN THE LAST YEAR OF BASE
1Rounding causes total percentage to be less than 100%.
Theoretically, nothing seems wrong with calculating discounted cash
107. Thus, for instance, in Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, the court established the
terminal value of Epic Realty Services, Inc. by applying a "multiple of 12 times 1989
projected earnings." 1988 WL 158i6, at *29. That terminal value was then discounted to
the present. Id.
PERCENTAGE'
FRACTION
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flow value by using projected earnings for a finite period plus a terminal
value, assuming this technique is properly understood and consistently
applied. 10 8 The key theoretical point here is that the terminal value should,
equal the discounted value of the company's cash flows beginning at the
end of the finite period.' 09 It seems unobjectionable to establish that
terminal value by some proxy value, such as, for example, the value that
could be garnered for the company at the end of the finite period if all the
stock in the company were sold in a public offering, so long as the
evaluator understands that the price the public would pay for the company
in that circumstance would amount to the present value of the company's
anticipated cash flows beginning at the end of the finite period. It may be,
as Brealey and Myers suggest, that this is a practical way to establish the
present value of the later years' cash flows. 
10
There does seem, however, to be an increased risk of confusion when
courts use such indirection to calculate cash flows. To use a finite number
of years plus a terminal value approach necessarily involves the courts in a
number of decisions that can get confusing. Questions arise, such as the
number of years in the finite stream and the calculation methodology for
terminal value. The more direct approach would require an estimate of
annual revenues for as long as one can foresee. Admittedly, when one gets
beyond a certain period, that becomes a very difficult prediction.
Nonetheless, it is hard to see how approaching the matter through
indirection improves the quality of the prediction.
c. Components of Cash Flows
In determining the present value of common stock in acquisition
cases, courts using a discounted cash flow methodology often include in
108. Brealey and Myers seem to raise no significant objections to this method.
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at 75-76.
109. Brealey and Myers state that it is "not practical to forecast free cash flow year by
year into infinity." Id. at 76. However, the present value of the company must include all of
the company's future cash flows, no matter how remote they may be. See discussion supra
note 16 and accompanying text. Courts have thus used terminal value measures as an
acceptable substitute for an ad infinitum year by year analysis. For instance, in Cavalier Oil
Corp. v. Harnett, the court employed the use of terminal value in placing a value on a
company's future cash flows, stating that the terminal value concept "is intended to
represent the future value of the corporation at the end of a fixed projection period once the
corporation's future cash flows have stabilized." 1988 WL 15816, at *20.
110. Brealey and Myers state that "the value of a business is usually computed as the
discounted value of free cash flows out to a valuation horizon (H), plus the forecasted value
of the business at the horizon, also discounted back to present value." BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 15, at 75. The authors explain this practical concession as necessary because
"it's not practical to forecast free cash flow year by year to infinity." Id. at 76.
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their cash flows amounts beyond dividends or even beyond GAAP
earnings. 111 Table 14 reports on this matter, indicating that in most cases
courts have included in cash flows certain expenses that under GAAP are
required to be deducted from net profits.
Referring to Table 14, in just 14% of the useable cases did the court
use only dividends as its cash flows, and in just 28% of those cases did the
court use only dividends or GAAP earnings. This means that courts in
72% of the cases from that population determined present value by
discounting a portion of the revenue stream that included some normal
GAAP expenses.
As the Table indicates, the most usual of these GAAP-deductible
expenses included in cash flows were non-cash expenses, such as
amortization or depreciation (36%). But in what may seem a surprisingly
high percentage of cases, cash flows also included certain cash expenses
deductible under GAAP, specifically interest charges (57%) and taxes
(29%). All of these require comment.
111. See infra Table 14.
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TABLE 14: COMPONENTS OF "CASH FLOWS": ALL
JURISDICTIONS; ALL PERIODS SINCE
WEINBERGER
112
CASH
CASH CASH CS
ACCOUN- FOS CAS CASH FLOWS
DIVIDEND TANT'S ILUwS FLws FLOWS INCLUDE
ONLY EARNINGS INCD INCLUE INCLUDE EXCESSONLY NON-CASH INTEREST Txs WOIN
ONLY EXPENSES CHARGES WORKING
CAPITAL
PERCENTAGE" 
)
FRACTIONM
)
14% 14% 36% 57% 29% 14%
2/14 2/14 5/14 8/14 4/14 2/14
(I)Represents the percentage or fraction of all cases in which cash flows included the
designated item. Percentages do not add up to 100%, and fractions do not add to 1, because,
for example, the cash flow used by a court may include one or more of the items: "Non-
Cash Expenses," "Interest Charges" or "Taxes."
The matter of including non-cash expenses in cash flows is the easiest
to understand and, indeed, is entirely appropriate. As described earlier,
113
scholars have long recognized that basing present value on accountant's
earnings may be distortive in cases where the company has large,
irregularly occurring non-cash charges, such as depreciation. 114  Perhaps
the real surprise here is that such non-cash charges were added back into
cash flows in only 36% of the cases.
Including interest charges in the cash flows that courts discount,
112. In Table 14, the column "Cash Flows Include Excess Working Capital" is
interesting but not directly implicated by the large points of this paper.
In situations in which courts have concluded that the company has more working
capital than it needs to run its operations, the courts may assume that the excess working
capital will be paid out to the shareholders. See, e.g., Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp.,
No. CIV.A. 8282, 1990 WL 109243, *15-16, *20-21. In that case, it is theoretically sound
to consider the amount to be paid to shareholders as a one time cash flow, provided that the
other projected earnings do not include any earnings capacity that could be generated by the
paid out excess working capital.
The legitimacy of the assumption that the excess working capital will be paid out is
itself a complex matter that is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Campbell,
supra note 8 (articulating an economic and moral theory for the appropriateness of
assumptions underlying corporate valuations).
113. See supra notes 21-25.
114. For a good explanation of this, see Blum & Katz, supra note 25, at 236-42. See
also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at 90 ("Cash flows and accounting income are often
very different... the accountant's decisions have nothing to do with ... cash flow... ").
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however, appears at first blush to be much more problematic. Interest
charges are real cash payments that must be deducted from the revenue
stream before shareholders are entitled to participate in the cash flows. 
1 15
To value shareholders' ownership by discounting pre-interest cash flows,
therefore, seems to over-value shareholders' claims.
116
The logic of determining the value of shareholders' ownership by
reference to pre-interest cash flows depends on subtracting the value of
debt instruments later in the calculations, before the court finally arrives at
the value of shareholders' claims. 117 So, if one discounts pre-interest cash
flows, one arrives at a value for both the creditors' and the equity owners'
interests in the company. One must, therefore, in order to arrive at the
value of the equity owners' ownership interests, subtract out of the value of
the company's outstanding debt. What is left at that point is value that
belongs to shareholders.
118
Finally, arriving at the value of a company to its shareholders by
discounting pre-tax projected cash flows seems troublesome for the reason
that shareholders have no claim on amounts used to pay taxes. 119 In at
least some of the cases in the population, however, the particular entity was
a non-tax paying entity. 120 In those cases, basing value on pre-tax earnings
makes sense.
2. Discount Factor
Table 15 shows the way courts from all jurisdictions have constructed
the discount factors that they have applied to the entity's cash flovs.
115. See supra Section I.B.4.
116. This implicates the point from Section I.B.4. of the text, which is that the value of
an interest in a company is determined by the value of the portion of the cash flows against
which the interest holder has a claim. See supra Section I.B.4.
117. See discussion supra Section I.B.4.
118. The propriety of the use of pre-interest cash flows is tied to the use of the
weighted average cost of capital as a method for determining the discount rate. See supra
text accompanying notes 45-47. Cases in which the court discounted the pre-interest cash
flows and later backed out the value of the debt instruments include CEDE & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084, at *27; In Re Radiology Assoc., 611 A.2d 485 (Del.
Ch. 1991); Gilbert v. MPM Enter., 709 A.2d 663 (Del. Ch. 1997).
119. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
120. In re Radiology Assoc., 611 A.2d at 492; McLane Gas Co. v. Enserch Corp., 1992
WL 368614, at *l(Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1992), affd, 633 A.2d 369 (Del. Ch. 1993).
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TABLE 15: DISCOUNT FACTOR: ALL JURISDICTIONS
CAPITAL. ASSET PRICING
PRICE CAPITAL WEIGHTED MODEL OR WEIG
EARNINGS ASSET PRICING AVERAGE COST AVE OSTEO
RATIO MODELP OF CAPITAL
)  AVERAGE COST OFCAPITAL(')
PERCENTAGE
FRACTION
57% 14% 29% 43%
16/28 4/28 8/28 12/28
(1)In all cases recorded under the "Weighted Average Cost of Capital" column, courts
used the capital asset pricing model to establish the cost of equity. These cases are reported
in the "Weighted Average Cost of Capital" column and are not included in the "Capital
Asset Pricing Model" column.
(2)Because the capital asset pricing model is used to compute the cost of equity capital
in the weighted average cost of capital method, the combined use of the two methods is
reported in this column.
In Table 15, one finds that courts in 57% of the cases used price-
earnings ratios from comparable companies as a basis for determining the
applicable discount rate.121 Separately, the capital asset pricing model and
the weighted average cost of capital were considerably less popular than
the price-earnings ratio method, with the capital asset pricing model by
itself being used by courts in 14% of the relevant cases and the weighted
average cost of capital being utilized in 29% of the relevant cases.
Combining cases using the capital asset pricing model with cases
using the weighted average cost of capital, however, one finds that the sum
of those two methods amounts to 43%, which approaches the percentage of
cases in which courts utilized price-earnings ratios to construct discount
121. In constructing a discount rate based on price-earnings ratios, courts may select a
group of companies comparable to the company that is the subject of the valuation and use
the price-earnings ratios of the comparable companies to establish the appropriate discount
rate for the company being valued. Charlip v. Lear Siegler, Inc., No. 5178, 1984 WL 8248,
at *3.4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1984).
Charlip is an example of a court relying on price-earnings ratios from comparative
companies as a basis for determining its discount rates. In that case, the petitioner offered
and the court accepted a multiplier derived from "a weighted average price/earnings ratio
for ... eleven comparable companies." Id. at *172. The logic for using price-earnings ratios
from comparable companies as a way to value the company in question can be explained
easily. If Alpha Co. is similar in all regards to Beta Co, including, therefore, similar as to
volatility of its earnings, and Alpha sells in the market at ten times its earnings (or a 10%
discount rate), it is logical that in the assumedly efficient market Beta will sell at ten times
its earnings (or a 10% discount rate).
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rates. Combining cases using the capital asset pricing model and the
weighted average cost of capital method makes sense, because courts in all
weighted average cost of capital cases in the data used the capital asset
pricing model to determine the cost of equity.
One sees, therefore, that the discount methodologies utilized by courts
are to an overwhelming degree rooted either in price-earnings ratios from
comparable companies or the capital asset pricing model. Omitted from
the Table and its population of cases, however, are a number of cases in
which the courts fail to explain the discount rate or its underlying
methodology adequately or make an arbitrary or unprincipled selection of a
particular discount rate. An example of the latter situation is Cavalier Oil
Corp. v. Harnett, in which the Delaware Chancery Court, without apparent
principle or analysis, selected a discount rate of 20%.122
Tables 16 and 17 separate the population of discounted cash flow
cases into Delaware and non-Delaware cases. Once again, the populations
get thinner, and one must account for this in interpreting the data.
Nonetheless, the data are revealing.
TABLE 16: DISCOUNT FACTOR: DELAWARE CASES
CAPITAL ASSET PRICING
PRICE CAPITAL WEIGHTED MODEL 
O R IEIG
EARNINGS ASSET PRICING AVERAGE COST AVELAGE 
COSTEO
RATIO MODEL
(1 OF CAPITAL
O) CAPITAL
2 S
PERCENTAGE
)
FRACTION
47% 16% 37% 53%
9/19 3/19 7/19 10/19
(1)In all cases recorded under the "Weighted Average Cost of Capital" column, courts
used the capital asset pricing model to establish the cost of equity. These cases are reported
in the "Weighted Average Cost of Capital" column and are not included in the "Capital
Asset Pricing Model" column.
(2)Because the capital asset pricing model is used to compute the cost of equity capital
in the weighted average cost of capital method, the combined use of the two methods is
reported in this column.
122. 1988 WL 15816, at *19. To make matters worse, the court referred to the
selection of a discount rate as "an exercise in shadow boxing." See id. In Camino, Inc. v.
Wilson, a federal district court, without any explanation of its methodology, selected 13.15%
as its discount rate. 59 F. Supp. 2d 962, 970 (D. Neb. 1999). In that case, however, the court
defended its selection by stating that the rate was "accepted by all the experts as
reasonable." Id. at 976.
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TABLE 17: DISCOUNT FACTOR: NON-DELAWARE CASES
WEIGHTED
AVERAGE COST
OF CAPITAL"'
CAPITAL ASSET PRICING
MODEL OR WEIGHTED
AVERAGE COST OF
CAPITAL 2 )
PERCENTAGE 78% 11% 11% 22%
FRACTION 7/9 1/9 1/9 2/9
(1)In all cases recorded under the "Weighted Average Cost of Capital" column, courts
used the capital asset pricing model to establish the cost of equity. These cases are reported
in the "Weighted Average Cost of Capital" column and are not included in the "Capital
Asset Pricing Model" column.
(2)Because the capital asset pricing model is used to compute the cost of equity capital
in the weighted average cost of capital method, the combined use of the two methods is
reported in this column.
Comparing the data from Table 16 with data from Table 17, one sees
that Delaware courts are more likely than non-Delaware courts to use
discount rates rooted in the capital asset pricing model (53% in Delaware
cases; 22% in non-Delaware cases). Non-Delaware courts, on the other
hand, rely more heavily on price-earnings ratios as a basis to calculate
discount rates (78% in non-Delaware cases; 47% in Delaware cases).
Table 18 displays only Delaware cases decided since January 1, 1991.
TABLE 18: DISCOUNT FACTOR: DELAWARE CASES
AFTER JANUARY 1, 1991
WEIGHTED
AVERAGE COST
OF CAPITAL'"
CAPITAL ASSET PRICING
MODEL OR WEIGHTED
AVERAGE COST OF
CAPITAL(2 )
(i)In all cases recorded under the "Weighted Average Cost of Capital" column, courts
used the capital asset pricing model to establish the cost of equity. These cases are reported
in the "Weighted Average Cost of Capital" column and are not included in the "Capital
Asset Pricing Model" column.
PRICE
EARNINGS
RATIO
CAPITAL
ASSET PRICING
MODEL" )
PRICE
EARNINGS
RATIO
CAPITAL
ASSET PRICING
MODEL
)
PERCENTAGE
FRACTION
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(2)Because the capital asset pricing model is used to compute the cost of equity capital
in the weighted average cost of capital method, the combined use of the two methods is
reported in this column.
Comparing now Table 18, later Delaware cases, to Table 16, all
Delaware cases since Weinberger, one sees a slightly higher percentage of
later Delaware cases that utilize a discount rate rooted in the capital asset
pricing model (53% in all Delaware cases; 61% in later Delaware cases).
Summarizing the data in Tables 15 through 18, one finds that
Delaware courts in a majority of their decisions utilize the capital asset
pricing model as a way to determine the discount rate, and the available
data indicate that the use of the capital asset pricing model may even be
increasing in Delaware. Other jurisdictions, however, continue principally
to construct discount rates by reference to price-earnings ratios of
comparable companies.1
23
One should expect courts to continue and perhaps to increase their
reliance on the capital asset pricing model. Two reasons support this
prediction. First, notwithstanding the debate about certain aspects of the
capital asset pricing model, the theory is, as Dean Thompson states,
"intuitively appealing".1 24 It seems to make sense that the market would
demand a return only (or mostly) for systematic risk and that the amount of
return the market demands for systematic risk for the particular company
can be estimated by the return the market demands in similar systematic
risk situations. 125 Brealey and Myers state that "[i]t will be very hard to
reject the CAPM beyond all reasonable doubt."
126
Second, the capital asset pricing model is accessible to judges. It
"captures these ideas [i.e., ideas respecting risk and return about which
there is broad agreement] in a simple way .... ,127 For courts, it is not
difficult to build a discount rate pursuant to the capital asset pricing model
by adding the riskless rate of return to the historical rate of return on a
market basket of stock times a stock's beta.128 Such simplicity and the
appearance of objectivity, especially when dealing with matters that are
apparently so complex and judgmental, will always be attractive to courts.
123. See supra Tables 15-18.
124. Thompson, supra note 14, at 520.
125. Thus, Brealey and Myers state that "all financial economists agree... [that]
[i]nvestors... appear to be concerned predominately with the risk that they cannot
eliminate by diversification." BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 15, at 195.
126. Id. at 188.
127. Id. at 184.
128. Id. at 181.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE DATA
The Weinberger decision in 1983 encouraged the hope that modem
finance theory would become the basis for court valuations in acquisition
cases. Unfortunately, the data from this article suggest that hope has not
been realized.
Most obvious in this regard are the under use of the discounted cash
flow methodology by courts and the overuse by courts of other
inappropriate methodologies, such as an asset valuation or a weighted
average valuation. To repeat what may be the most important data, only
31% of all cases from all jurisdictions decided since Weinberger were
based on the discounted cash flow methodology. 129 On the other hand,
20% of the cases during that time period were decided under the asset
valuation method, and 30% of the cases were decided under the weighted
average method.1
30
The Delaware numbers are somewhat better, showing that 49% of the
Delaware cases since Weinberger were decided under the discounted cash
flow method, while 19% were based on an asset valuation and 14% were
based on a weighted average methodology.131
It is impossible, however, to square these data, even the somewhat
better Delaware data, with an appropriate use by courts of modem finance
theory. Considering, first, the levels of use of the discounted cash flow
method reflected in the data, financial economists agree that the value of an
asset is determined by anticipated cash flows, discounted to reflect the time
value of money and risk,132 and certainly it is difficult to argue with the
psychological and behavioral underpinnings for this methodology. What
an asset is worth in the marketplace is determined by what it will earn in
the future, but because of the opportunity cost of capital and the volatility
risk of the potential earnings, the market will pay less for the asset than the
sum of the stream. 133 None of this, when properly understood, seems
controversial.
On the other hand, the levels of use of asset valuation and the
weighted average valuation by courts are problematic on a number of
fronts. The asset valuation method, as described earlier, is inconsistent
with the legal rule that valuation in fair price and fair value cases must
129. Seesupra Table 1, at 14.
130. See supra Table 1, at 14.
131. See supra Table 4, at 17.
132. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 19, 30.
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amount to the going concern value) 34 This rule - rejecting a liquidation
value in favor of a going concern value - is entirely consistent with the ex
ante expectation of investors, who invest expecting managers to conduct
the affairs of the corporation in a reasonable fashion and to generate
corporate earnings against which the investors have a claim. 135 As a result,
in nearly all cases investors expect their future value to be measured by on-
going operations of the company and certainly not by any lesser amounts
generated by the sale of the underlying net assets. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine when value in an acquisition case might appropriately be based on
the company's asset value.
136
The weighted average method, more specifically, the Delaware block
approach, has been subjected to extensive and unanswered criticism over
the years. 137 While such theoretical criticisms are generally valid, it is the
weighting of the various components of a weighted average approach that
most vividly exposes the fundamental flaws and misdirection of the
methodology. No one has ever provided a satisfactory standard for
assigning weight to the factors used in a weighted average valuation. 138
This failure is the inevitable result of the disconnect between the factors
and their assigned weights under the Delaware Block approach, on the one
134. This is a long standing rule in Delaware. See, e.g., Tri-Continental Corp., 74
A.2d at 72. It continues today. See, e.g., In re of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d at 1218; Rapid-
Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 799 (Del. 1992).
135. See Camiibell, supra note 8, at 139-49.
136. Theoretically, the only time an asset methodology, as opposed to a discounted
cash flow methodology, should be used to value a company is when the assets of the
company are to be sold instantly for a price that is fixed and certain. If the sale is not
instantly completed, the expected proceeds must be discounted to reflect the time value of
money; if the amount to be received is less than a sum certain, the proceeds must be
discounted to accommodate the volatility risk of the proceeds.
Consider, for example, the somewhat unusual cases in which the liquidation value of
the company's assets exceeds the going concern value of the company. Although one may
anticipate that managers, pursuant to their duty to maximize shareholder wealth, will sell the
assets and liquidate the company, the appropriate methodology for valuing the company is
nonetheless the discounted cash flow method. The liquidation will not occur immediately,
and it is impossible to predict, from within a range of outcomes, exactly what the liquidation
will bring. Thus, the liquidation proceeds must be discounted to reflect the time value of
money and the volatility risk that associated with the liquidation price.
137. See Calio supra note 6.
138. Regarding weighting, one author concludes that "virtually no weighing guidelines
exist. The weight assigned to each of the [components of the Delaware block method] ... is
usually reflective of the confidence level or accuracy of each element's valuation .. " See
Calio, supra note 6, at 37. To assign weights according to the court's confidence in the
accuracy of the particular factor is, at best, sophistry. The fact, for example, that a court can
most accurately determine the liquidation value of the corporation says nothing about
whether using such a valuation is consistent with the court's obligation. Courts are not
obliged to select an improper method of valuation simply because it is easy to calculate.
Syracuse Law Review
hand, and the psychological and behavioral bases of economic value, on the
other. In short, the factors and the weighting of the factors in a weighted
average methodology make sense only to the extent they amount to proxies
for the essential elements of value, which elements are broadly agreed to be
the future value generated for investors from the investment and the factor
by which such future value must be discounted.'
39
It is not, however, just the data reflecting frequency of utilization of
various methodologies that show the difficulties courts have in these cases.
In fact, even the data from cases in which courts use the preferred
methodology, the discounted cash flow method, provide examples of the
use of problematic finance theory. For example, the data indicate that in
30% of the cases using some form of the discounted cash flow method,
courts discounted historical earnings rather than projected earnings.' 40 The
data also show courts using various and sometimes theoretically
questionable portions of the revenue stream as a basis to arrive at a
discounted cash flow valuation. 141 One also finds in the data cases in which
courts have established discount rates without explanation or apparent
principle.'
42
Certainly one should not overlook the fact that some of the data,
separately considered, may be encouraging. For example, some may find
the increasing use of the capital asset pricing model in discounted cash
flow cases to be a positive development. 143 Also, one might be encouraged
by the somewhat higher use of the discounted cash flow in recent
periods.14 4  This limited amount of favorable data, however, does not
overcome the negative aspect of the data considered as a whole. One
cannot be encouraged by data indicating that courts in the more recent
period continued to use the discounted cash flow in only 37% of their cases
while during the same period relying on the weighted average method and
the asset valuation method, considered together, in a total of 42% of all
cases.
145
When one tries to explain this data and thus to explain the apparent
limited progress that has been made in the last twenty years toward the use
of modern finance theory in valuation cases, two related factors should be
139. See BREALEY &MYERS, supra note 15, at 113-15.
140. See supra Table 10, at 31.
141. See supra Table 14, at 36. One is, of course, able to find theoretical mistakes in
cases from the author's population of cases.
142. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
143. Cf. Table 16 with Table 18, supra.
144. Cf Table 2 with Table 3, supra.
145. See supra Table 3, at 16.
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considered.
The first factor involves the nature of the evidence that parties offer
courts in valuation cases. Generally, when examining particular court
opinions from the data, one finds too many courts overwhelmed by massive
amounts of complex, tedious, technical valuation evidence offered by the
parties, evidence that is often so dense that not even the best judges have
any realistic chance of sorting through the testimony of the parties' experts
and ultimately coming to a sensible conclusion.
Part of the complexity that courts face in these decisions is due to the
fact that courts usually are offered multiple valuation methodologies in
each case.146 Thus, in useable cases from the data, courts on average were
presented a total of 2.4 evaluation methodologies per case. 147 In 43% of
the cases, courts were presented with a total of three or more valuation
methodologies that they were required to sort through,148 and in only 23%
of the cases were courts offered a single valuation methodology by the
parties. Indeed, in 56% of the useable cases, at least one of the parties
itself offered more than one valuation method to the court in support of its
position on value.
149
146. Complexity can, of course, be caused or exacerbated by other factors. E.g.,
Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 74 F. Supp.2d 876 (E.D. Mo. 1999). This case may represent
the outer edge of extreme complexity. The dissenters offered evidence of valuation under
three different parameters: first, that no minority or non-marketability discount was to be
included in fair value; second that a minority discount would apply; and, finally, that both a
minority discount and a non-marketability discount would apply. Id. at 887 Under each
parameter, dissenters then offered three valuation methodologies. Id. To complicate
matters further, two of the methodologies offered by the dissenters' expert were applied
separately to each of Siegel-Robert's six segments, and one of those methodologies applied
separately to each segment was comparative ratio method based on six ratios. Id. at 890.
The third methodology used by the dissenters' expert was applied at the holding company
level. Id. at 910.
147. This average is based upon 53 useable cases. As indicated previously, the data is
extracted from 76 cases decided since Weinberger. From that total, only 53 were considered
useable on the matter of offerings by the parties.
148. This is based upon 53 useable cases. In 23 of those cases the plaintiffs and
defendants offered the court a total of at least three evaluation methodologies. See
Appendix.
149. This is based on 53 useable cases, and in 29 of those cases, at least one of the
parties offered more than one valuation methodology to the court. See Appendix.
An example of a single party offering multiple evaluation methodologies in support of
its position was Kahn v. Tremont Corp., a case in which the court was required to evaluate
the fair price of a merger under five different methodologies offered by one party. No.
CIV.A. 12339, 1996 WL 145452, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1996). The methodologies were
the discounted cash flow method, the asset valuation method, the deal value method, the
comparative ratio method and a method based on the company's market value. Without
selecting the appropriate valuation method, the Chancery Court found that all five of the
methodologies supported the conclusion that the exchange price was fair. Id. at * 14.
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One should not be surprised to find that the parties as between
themselves offer different methodologies to the court. Each party,
operating under the flexibility of a Weinberger regime, will offer the court
the valuation methodology that enhances its own chances of an outcome
favorable to itself. One might expect that the methodology that supports
the highest possible value (the plaintiff's position) and the lowest possible
value (the defendant's position) are often different, and the data are
consistent with that conclusion.
For at least two reasons, a single party may feel it advantageous to
offer the court more than one valuation methodology. First, a party may
see its chances of a court's accepting its particular estimate of value
enhanced if the party supports its valuation under multiple theories. So the
party may say, essentially: "I propose that the company is worth $100 per
share, and here are three evaluation methodologies, each of which supports
a valuation of at least $100 per share." 150 Alternatively, a party may have
no good idea of which methodology is the court's favorite or may conclude
from past decisions that the court uses different methodologies, depending
on the facts of the case, or, perhaps more disturbing, may conclude that the
court selects different valuation methodologies without any evidence of a
discernable principle. Once again, therefore, a logical strategy in such a
circumstance is for a party to present multiple valuation methodologies in
the hope that at least one of the methodologies will appeal to the court. 151
In addition to the overwhelming, complexity of the evidence, courts
often face evidence offered by opposing, well paid, highly credentialed
152
experts whose opinions may be rendered essentially incredible by the
differences between their respective estimates of value. These differences
Even in cases in which no party offered more than one of the methodologies
categorized by this article, when parties proposed a weighted average method of valuation,
courts were faced with evaluating multiple methodologies within that single, weighted
average methodology. An example of this was Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp., where
the petitioner weighed values derived from the comparative ratio method, the asset value
method and the discounted cash flow method. 1990 WL 109243, *6.
150. See, e.g., Kahn, 1996 WL 145452. In a fair price case, the company's expert used
five valuation methods, each of which, according to the testimony, supported its contention
that the price offered was fair. Id. at *11.
15 1. Unfortunately, none of these pressures that compel parties to offer courts multiple
valuation methodologies shows any sign of abatement. Indeed, data indicate that courts in
more recent cases actually face even slightly more valuation offerings than they did in
earlier cases.
152. For example, the court in Onti Inc. v. Integra Bank, described the credentials of
one expert: "Since 1988,. .. [he] has been on the faculty of the Harvard Graduate School of
Business and is currently the Willard Prescott Smith Professor of Corporate Finance at that
school. Prior to that he taught finance at Sloan School of management at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology for seven years." 751 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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in value estimated by the competing experts can in some cases be
significantly different 153 and in other cases be wildly different.
154
In his fine article on appraisal actions, Professor Barry Wertheimer
provides information regarding the valuation estimates offered by the
competing parties in 41 appraisal cases decided after 1984.155 From
Professor Wertheimer's cases that were useable for this paper,156 the value
estimate offered by the dissenting shareholder was on average 5.6 times
higher than that offered by the corporation. 157 The widest differences one
finds are in Campbell v. Caravel Acad. Inc.,158 TV58 Ltd. Partnership v.
Weigel Broacasting Co., 159 and Ely, Inc. v. Wiley, 160 where the estimates of
value by the dissenting shareholders were, respectively, 612 times, 32 times
and 16 times that of the corporations'.
A court, therefore, may face the difficult task of determining the
present value of a company involved in an acquisition without evidence
that it finds intelligible and credible. Not surprisingly, therefore, one finds
in the cases from the data judicial expressions of frustration about the
complexity of evidence, 161 the multiplicity of methodologies offered by the
parties 162 and the outlandishness of the estimates of value offered by
153. In Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., the dissenter's expert estimated value of the
company at an amount ($862 million) that was 58% higher than the company's expert
estimate of value ($622). 74 F. Supp. 2d at 922.
154. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
155. Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 713-14.
156. Thirty-four of Professor Wertheimer's cases were useable on this point.
157. For the purpose this calculation, the case of Campbell v. Caravel Acad., Inc., was
excluded, because the dissenting shareholder offered the court a valuation that was 612.2
times higher than the company. No. CIV.A. 7830, 1988 WL 63492, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 16,
1988), aff'd, 553 A.2d 638 (Del. 1988). Such extremeness in the offerings would seem to
distort the average. With Campbell in the cases, dissenting shareholders offering of value
was 23.4 times that of the company (without Campbell it was 5.6 times).
158. See id. at *4-5
159. See 1993 WL 285850 at *1.
160. 546 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
161. In commenting on the general complexity of the valuation evidence before it and
the difficulties caused by such complexity, the chancellor in Harris v. Rapid-Am. Corp., No.
CIV.A. 6462, 1990 WL 146488, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part,
remanded, Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. Ch. 1992), remarked that "there
are only so many days in the year" available for it to sort out all of the complexities in such
cases. Id .at *8. The same court later admitted or, perhaps, lamented, that it did "not have
the expertise or the resources to carefully scrutinize every turn and twist in petitioners'
analysis." Id. at *10.
162. See, e.g., Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., No. CIV.A. 7499, 1989 WL 17438, at
*7-8 (Del. Ch. Feb 28, 1989) ("it is problematic enough to decide between even two
conflicting appraisals. To be confronted with eight of them boggles the mind .. "). On
the other hand, courts at times express satisfaction when they face only a single valuation
methodology. See, e.g., Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., No. CIV.A. 12339,
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competing experts.
163
The second point worth considering in connection with the data is
that, twenty years after Weinberger, we have very little common law
respecting valuation. This is due principally to the extreme breadth of
discretion that courts in a Weinberger regime have when they select the
valuation methodology to be used in a particular case. In such a regime,
the common law has little opportunity to develop.
When a court faces its first case under a Weinberger-type regime, it is
free to choose from among any methodology offered by the parties, so long
as that methodology is within the very broad limitations of Weinberger,
which require only that the methodology be one that is "generally
considered acceptable in the financial community."' 164  The same
exceedingly broad standard is applicable when the court selects its
valuation methodology in its second case. 165 As a result, even if the court
in its first case were to select the discounted cash flow method and employ
the capital asset pricing model as a basis for determining its discount rate,
the court in the second case could decide to use the weighted average
method and calculate its earnings value component using historical
earnings and its discount rate under the price-earnings method.
166
Essentially, under a Weinberger regime, the methodology selection in first
case is not precedent for the second case.
In addition to the fact that almost no common law develops under this
regime, another related and insidious result is that the parties in the second
case have the same incentives as they did in the first case to introduce
complex and extreme evidence of value. Nothing has changed because of
the court's opinion in the first case. Thus the parties in the second case,
1997 WL 538676, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1997) ("That the parties have agreed to the use
of a single valuation method significantly eases this Court's burden of determining fair
value of Vitalink .... ).
163. See Charlip v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 1984 WL 8248, at *2. Where the dissenters'
expert claimed the value of the stock in question was $22.46 per share and the company's
expert valued the stock at $0.545 per share, the court responded by observing that "[t]he
breadth of the dispute... [between the experts] tends to border on the absurd" Id. at *2. In
a more literary expression of such frustration, the judge in Gilbert v. MPM Enterprises, Inc.,
characterized the competing experts valuation testimony as follows: "[o]ne report is
submitted by Dr. Pangloss, and the other by Mr. Scrooge." 709 A.2d at 667. See also,
Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. CIV.A. 8474, 1996 WL 696936, at *1
(Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 701 A.2d 357 (Del. Ch. 1997) ("The case
presented rather a typical appraisal trial in the sense that the dynamics of the judicial
appraisal process tend to produce opinion evidence of absurdly differing values.").
164. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
165. Id. at 713.
166. Id.
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once again and for the same reasons as in the first case, are impelled to
offer complex, tedious and extreme evidence of valuation, again
complicating the work of the court in its second case and again making it
more difficult for the court to reach a satisfactory result.
This cycle will continue to repeat itself, since in the third and all
future cases the parties have the same incentives to repeat the same
litigation strategies by offering the court overwhelming amounts of
complex and extreme evidence of value.
To break this cycle, courts must abandon a regime of extreme
flexibility generated by cases such as Weinberger and begin to establish
clear and sensible valuation rules to be applied in all cases. A regime of
rules, as contrasted to a regime of extreme flexibility, is essential if we are
to extricate ourselves from the present judicial quagmire and permit the
common law to develop sensibly in this area.
167
This regime of rules, in turn, should be based on broadly agreed upon
concepts derived from modem finance theory. Thus, as a starting point,
courts should adopt the discounted cash flow methodology as the valuation
theory to be used in acquisition cases.
1 68
Moving to more specific parts of valuation theory, and focusing first
on cash flows, courts should rule that future and not historic cash flows are
the basis for valuations, that cash flows should not be computed based on
GAAP principles, that cash flows must include the proceeds anticipated
from the sales of assets, and that, in determining the value of a
shareholder's interest in a corporation, cash flows include only amounts to
which the shareholder is entitled.
169
On the discounting side of the equation, financial economists also
agree broadly that the stream of anticipated cash flows must be discounted
to reflect the time value of money and risk'7 ° and that, normally, the time
value of money is computed by reference to the return on government
167. A recent amendment to the Model Business Corporation Act states that fair value
in appraisals is determined "using customary and current valuation concepts and techniques
generally employed for similar businesses in the context of the transaction requiring
appraisal... "Model Bus. Corp. Act. § 13.01(4) (ii). This language may be read to support
the continuation of a regime of extreme flexibility. On the other hand, if financial
economists broadly agree that the discounted cash flow is the preferred valuation method,
the language should not preclude adoption of that methodology in valuation cases. The
language should in no case be read as discouraging the development of concrete rules of
valuation that are consistent with broadly agreed upon modem finance theory.
168. Id.
169. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
20031
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securities. 171 Once again, these are appropriate rules for courts to adopt.
One does, however, encounter significant economic debate about risk
and the proper way to calculate a risk premium, but even here one, once
more, finds areas of theoretical agreement among most financial
economists.
172
In addition to a significant amount of broad theoretical agreement
about risk, we also have, as previously indicated, an enormous amount of
historical data about risk and specifically about the return the market has
over a long period of time required for certain types of risk.173  Courts
pondering the matter of an appropriate risk premium can easily determine,
for example, that over the last seventy years or so, the average risk
premium has been about 2% on corporate bonds, 8.4% on the S&P 500 and
13.7% on small corporations.'
74
Establishing a regime of rules informed by modern finance theory
would have a dramatic and positive impact on the way valuation matters in
acquisition cases are handled. The most obvious change, of course, would
be in the 69% of the cases that, historically at least, are determined under
theories other than the discounted cash flow method.
175
Under this regime, courts also should face a more manageable task in
valuation cases. The parties' evidence would necessarily focus on
estimates of cash flows and discount rates. As a result, evidentiary and
value estimation disputes between the parties on the matter of cash flows,
for example, may involve the probability of war 176 or the probability that a
brand of beer may increase in popularity in ensuing years.17 7 While these
171. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 8, 10-12 and accompanying text.
176. The allusion here is the old proceedings surrounding the reorganization of the
Atlas Pipeline Corporation. See In re Atlas Pipeline Corporation, 39 F. Supp. 846 (W.D.
La. 1941). In the course of the reorganization of Atlas under federal bankruptcy rules, the
Securities and Exchange Commission rendered an advisory opinion to the court on whether
the proposed plan met statutory standards. Id. at 846. The Commission's advisory opinion,
in turn, was based on its valuation of Atlas as a going concern. See, In re of Atlas Pipeline
Corporation, 9 S.E.C. 416 (1941). It turned out that the Commission's opinion substantially
undervalued Atlas, apparently because the Commission underestimated the probability that
the United States would enter World War II and the impact it would have on an oil refining
company, such as Atlas. See generally, VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON,
BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN'S CORPORATE FINANCE CASES AND MATERIALS 6-32 (4th ed.
1993).
177. The allusion here is to the Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co. No. CIV.A. 7244, 1993
WL 208763, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993). In that case, one of the party's experts offered a
valuation based on the assumption "that the volume of Pabst's sales would increase by 1.5%
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examples show that courts will continue to have difficult judgments to
make in valuation cases, the examples also suggest that the judgments
courts would be asked to make under such a regime of rules would tend to
involve more of the types of decisions that courts are able to handle and,
indeed, the types of decisions that historically they have always made.
None of this is possible, however, until courts turn their backs on the
regime of extreme flexibility generated by cases such as Weinberger and
develop a common law of valuation informed by modem finance theory.
V. APPENDIX
The following table, TABLE: POPULATION OF CASES, lists all the
cases upon which the data in the article are based. In the event more than
one court considered a case, as, for example, where a case was appealed,
the opinion of each court is considered and reported separately.
Under the heading of "Parties" in the TABLE: POPULATION OF
CASES , the following abbreviations and symbols are used to report the
valuation methodologies offered by the parties in the particular case:
"DCF" (Discounted Cash Flows) - A valuation methodology based
principally on the discounted value of the company's projected cash flows.
"AV" (Asset Value) - A valuation methodology based principally on
the liquidation value of the company's net assets.
"D/V" (Deal Value) - A valuation methodology determined by
reference to prices paid in other acquisitions.
"CmpRto" (Comparative Ratios) - A valuation methodology based
principally on one or more key financial ratios from actively traded
comparable companies.
"WtAv" (Weighted Average) - A valuation methodology that
considers various factors or methods of valuation and assigns a weight to
each factor.
"Otr" (Other Valuation Methodologies) - A category for any
valuation method other than the five methods described above.
Where no entry appears, the particular methodology was not offered
by the party or was unreported in the opinion.
Under the heading of "Courts", the TABLE: POPULATION OF
CASES uses the same abbreviations for valuation methodologies as was
used under the heading of "Parties". In addition, under the heading of
"Courts", the following abbreviations and symbols are used:
per year." Id.
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"Acpt" (Accepted) - The valuation methodology accepted by the
court. Where no entry appears, the court was not required to select a
methodology or the selection was unreported by the opinion.
"Discount Rate" (Discount Rate) - The methodology the court
employed to construct its discount or capitalization rate. Where no entry
appears, the court did not use a discount rate or its methodology was
unexplained. The data in this column include cases in which a court used
DCF and cases where a court used a methodology, such as WtAv or
CmpRto, in which one of the components of the valuation methodology
included a discounting of earnings. Methodologies used to determine
discount rates in this column include:
"CAPM" (capital asset pricing model) - A discount rate constructed
by use of the capital asset pricing model.
"p/e" (price/earnings ratio) - A discount rate constructed by using the
price earnings ratios from comparable companies.
"WACC" (weighted average cost of capital) - A discounted rate
constructed by using the weighted average cost of capital method. In
all cases reported as WACC, the court used CAPM to calculate the
company's cost of equity.
"+/-% MergPr" - The percentage increase ("+") or decrease ("-") of
the court's award over the original acquisition price offered by the
company. This column remains blank in instances in which the matter
is not an issue in the case or in which the court did not give sufficient
information to make the calculation.
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TABLE: POPULATION OF CASES
Case Names Parties Courts
and
Citations
mCF tTI t Discount /-%
Rto &v Rate Mer.Pr
1. CEDE & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., No. DCF
IV.A. 7129, 1999 W.
65042 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29
1999).
2. Sieg Co. v. Kelly, 568
N.W.2d 794 (Iowa 1997). X XmpRto +1.77
3. Sieg Co. v. Kelly, 512
N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 1994). xmpRto +44 and
+90
4. In re Valuation of
Common Stock of McLoon X xtAv +260
Oil Co., 565 A. 2d 997 AN
(Me. 1989).
5. Pasklill Corp. v. Alcoma
Corp., No. CIVA. 16221 A/V +6
1999 WL 438832 (Del. Ch.
June 16, 1999).
6. CEDE & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., No. CF WACC
IV.A. 7129, 1990 WL
161084 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19
1990).
7. Harris v. Rapid-Am.
Corp., No. CIV.A. 6462 X X CmpRto +82
1990 WL 146488 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 2, 1990).
8. Rapid-American Corp.
v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796 CmpRto
(Del. 1992).
9. Harris v. Rapid-
American Corp., No. mpRto 
162
IV.A. 6462, 1992 WL
69614 (Del. Ch. March 20
1992).
10. Kahn v. Household
Acquisition Corp., No X X x A/V21
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Case Names Parties Courts
and.__.dd
Citations
CF N mp t ct Discount /-%
Rto v ate __.Pr
CIV.A. 6293, 1988 WL
45474 (Del. Ch. May 6,
1988).
It. Kahn v. Household
cquisition Corp., 591 AN
.2d 166 (Del. 1991).
12. Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett, No. CIV.A. 7959,
1988 WL 15816 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 22, 1988) - involved
valuation of two
companies, separated
below.
EMSI ,
_ _ _ _ DCF _300
ERSI
_ _ _ _ _DCF
13. Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 DCF
(Del. 1989). 1 1
14. Stauffacher v.
Checota, 441 N.W.2d 755
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989
(unpublished opinion).
15. Le Beau v. M.G.
Bancorporation, Inc., No. x X X D/ +115
CIV.A. 13414, 1998 W.
44993 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29,
1998).
16. M.G. Bancorporation
Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d DN +115
513 (Del. 1999).
17. In re Appraisal of
Shell Oil Co., No. CIV.A. X V +22.8
8080, 1990 WL 201390
(Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1990). 1 1 1
18. In re Appraisal of
Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d AN +22.8
1213 (Del. 1992).
2003] The Impact of Modern Finance Theory
Case Names Parties Courts
and
Citations
CF N mp Wt Ct 
Discount
Rto Av Rate erPr
19. Neal v. Alabama By- X DCF APM +156
Products Corp., No.
C1V.A. 8282, 1990 WL
109243 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1,
1990).
20. Alabama By-Prods.
Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d DCF CAPM +156
255 (Del. 1991).
21. Campbell v. Caravel
Acad., Inc., No. CIV.A. A
7830, 1988 WL 63492
Del. Ch. June 16, 1988).
22. Caravel Acad., Inc. v.
Campbell, 553 A.2d 638 A/V
Del. 1988).
23. Charlip v. Lear
Siegler, Inc., No. 5178 DCF p/e
1984 WL 8248 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 27, 1984).
24. Van de Walle v.
Unimation, Inc., No. X tr
CV.A. 7046, 1991 WL
29303 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7
1991).
25. TV58 Ltd. P'ship v.
Weigel Broadcasting Co., DCF /e +3,066
No. CIV.A. 10798, 1993
VL 285850 (Del. Ch. July
22, 1993). 1 1 1
26. Metlyn Realty Corp. v. X
Esmark, Inc., 763 F.2d 826
7th Cir. 1985).
27. Robbins & Co. v. A.C.
Israel Enter., Inc., No. Xc A/V p/e 122
CIV.A.7919, 1985 WL Otr
149627 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, DCF
1985).
28. Alpert v. 28 Williams
St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d I Otr
NY 1984). 11
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and
Citations
mp t iscount /-%
DCF A D/V tr tM
to v Rate MerPr
29. Kahn v. Tremon
Corp., No. CIV.A. 12339, X Ie
1996 WL 145452 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 21, 1996).
30. Gonsalves v. Straight
Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. WtAv /e +31.6
IV.A. 8474, 1996 Wl
696936 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27,
1996).
31. Gonsalves v. Straight
Arrow Publishers, Inc. DCF p/e N/A
793 A.2d 312 (Del. Ch.
1998).
32. Cooper v. Pabst
Brewing Co., No. CIV.A. X x Otr +12.5% o
7244, 1993 WL 208763 -erger price;
(Del. Ch. June 8, 1993). 8.5% of blend.
ender price
33. Onti, Inc. v. Integra
Bank, 751 A.2d 904 (Del. X WtAv tr +168
Ch. 1999).
34. Weigel Broadcasting A/V -18.3
Co. v. Smith, 682 N.E.2d
745 (111. App. Ct. 1996).
35. In re Glosser Bros.,
Inc., 555 A.2d 129 (Pa. WtAv
Super. Ct. 1989).
36. Belk of Spartanburg,
S.C., Inc. v. Thompson, X WtAv p/e 1.6
522 S.E.2d 357 (S.C. Ct.
pp. 1999)
37. Borruso v.
Communications DCF /e 3000
Telesystems Int'l, 753
A.2d 451 (Del. Ch. 1999).
38. Dermody v. Sticco.
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Case Names Parties Courts
and-
Citations
F N mp Wt ct 
Discount
to Av te erPr
465 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. x WtAv 0
Ct. Ch. Div. 1983).
39. King v. F.T.J., Inc.,
765 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. Ct. X AN N/A
App. 1988). Otr
40. In re Radiology
Assoc., 611 A.2d 485 (Del. x DCF ACC +171.0
Ch. 1991).
41. Institutional Equip. &
Interiors, inc. v. Hughes, X A +41.4
562 N.E.2d 662 (II1. App.
Ct. 1990).
42. Miller Bros. Indus.
Inc. v. Lazy River Inv. Co. WtAv
709 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2000).
43. Richardson v. Palmer x Wtv /e -107
Broadcasting Co., 353
N.W.2d 374 (Iowa 1994).
44. Steiner Corp. v.
Beninghoff, 5 F. Supp. 2d WtAv CAPM -17.3
1117 (D. Nev. 1998). 1
45. Keefe v. Citizens & N.
Bank, 808 F.2d 246 (3d Wt. Av -3.8
Cir. 1986). 1
46. Armstrong v.
Marathon Oil Co., 513 Otr
N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 1987). /
47. Pittsburgh Terminal
Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio X DCF /e 0
R.R., 875 F.2d 549 (6th
Cir. 1989). 1 1
48. BNE Massachusetts
Corp. v. Sims, 588 N.E.2d XtAv N/A
14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). _ _ -f -
49. Gilbert v. MPM _ 
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and
Citations
DC / NCmp Wt Ot M Discount F-DCF A/ D/ 3tr C
Rto Av Rate MergPr
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